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This project identifies current sources of cost savings and cost avoidance 
generated through Army foreign military sales (FMS). Using a comparative high-low 
case-study approach, a high-demand volume case and a low-demand volume case were 
selected in major weapons categories. The cases were analyzed on an internal basis to 
determine cost savings, cost avoidance, and public value. Once the cases were analyzed 
and compared against each other, advantages or trends in cost savings, cost avoidance, 
and public value became apparent.  Upon completion of our analysis, we determined that 
cost savings were usually gained from reduced system unit costs due to higher economic 
order quantities, reduced overhead costs per unit, and reduced unit costs resulting from 
manufacturing learning curves. Additional costs were avoided by reducing gaps in 
production lines. Furthermore, we determined that the Army’s FMS strategy needs 
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In 1976, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted an analysis to 
determine cost savings resulting from foreign military sales (FMS) at the request of the 
House Armed Services Committee. The 1976 CBO report, prepared by CBO’s Budget 
Analysis Division, analyzed 35 weapon systems across the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and noted that only 50% of FMS resulted in a cost savings to the United States. 
The sales that were able to generate savings did so at a rate of 14 cents of savings for 
every dollar of sales (Capra, Schafer, & Renehan, 1976, p. ix). The study also found that 
the U.S. military industrial base and military programs have seen significant changes 
since 1976, warranting a current investigation of the FMS program’s ability to generate 
economic value for U.S. taxpayers (Capra, Schafer, & Renehan, 1976, p. ix). The 
objective of this study is to address this need. This study develops a framework from 
which to analyze cost avoidance, cost savings, and public value and applies this 
framework to estimate the net benefit to U.S. taxpayers.  
According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) website, “The 
Foreign Military Sales [FMS] program is a form of security assistance authorized by the 
Arms Export Control Act [AECA] and a fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy” 
(Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA], n.d.-b). FMS functions as a strategic 
partnership program used by the United States Government (USG) to develop and 
maintain relationships with both foreign countries and the defense industry. According to 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, since 1950, the USG has realized over $420 
trillion in FMS with more than 200 different countries (DSCA, n.d.-b). In the current 
economic and budgetary climate, the USG needs to continually leverage FMS advantages 
to maintain the U.S. industrial base, in addition to reducing the capability gaps of our 
foreign partners.  
Extant studies of the value of FMS make economic assumptions in regard to 
economies of scale. These reports do not go beyond the notion that increased production 
results in lower costs. However, research and practice suggest many alternative sources 
of value (e.g., learning curve, labor pools, common block upgrades). A deeper 
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understanding of the broad spectrum of potential sources of value will allow the USG to 
better leverage increased global demand and capture added value for the taxpayer. A 
current and more complete understanding of actual cost savings and cost avoidance of 
FMS will benefit the USG’s entities—from the program office to the taxpayer—by 
allowing decision-makers to make more informed choices and capture more value from 
the FMS program.  
The purpose of this study is to assess the impacts of the FMS program on the 
USG, the defense industry, and the U.S. taxpayer. This study 
• identifies the DOD and Army FMS demand trends 
• defines cost savings and cost avoidance  
• creates a framework from which to analyze the impacts of FMS 
• analyzes the barriers to leveraging FMS to generate cost savings and cost 
avoidances. 
This study utilizes a comparative case study analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2009) using two heterogeneous organizations, purposefully selected to represent the 
upper limit and lower limits of Army FMS sales volume. A case study design is 
appropriate when, as in this study, the researcher is answering how and why questions 
focused on contemporary events, and has no control over the associated behavior (Yin, 
2009, p. 6).  
This study finds that the largest recipient of FMS programs is the U.S. taxpayer. 
FMS clearly reduces the cost to procure a weapon system. However, cost savings are 
difficult to measure and do not necessarily increase the reinvestment opportunity of the 
program. Congruent with extant studies, this study finds that cost savings result from 
economies of scale. Additionally, cost savings are gained through international 
cooperative developments. These reduce the average program unit cost (APUC) by 
allowing the program office to negotiate economic order quantity (EOQ) reduction rates 
and share in the development costs of innovative technologies. 
The remainder of the project is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the 
setting of the study, the organizations involved, and how the DOD and Army are 
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organized to support the FMS process. Chapter II also describes the FMS process and 
supporting definitions. Chapter III describes the research methods, including data 
sources, data, and analysis approach. Chapter IV presents the analysis and findings. 
Chapter V is a discussion of the recommendations and implications from analysis and 
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II. FMS OVERVIEW 
A. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF FMS 
This section describes the history, background, and legislative acts that have led 
to the current FMS Program. It also details the major organizations involved in the FMS 
program and provides an overview of each organization’s roles and responsibilities. 
Additionally, several reports from various organizations are assessed to discuss some 
current challenges with the FMS program. 
1. FMS Overview 
The FMS program is a non-profit program (Defense Institute for Security 
Assistance Management [DISAM], 2014, p. 65) governed by DOD Directive (DODD) 
5105.38-M, also known as the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). The 
SAMM states, “the United States Government (USG) may sell, grant, or lease defense 
articles and services to a country or international organization only if the President makes 
a determination that the prospective purchaser is eligible” (DSCA, 2012, p. C4.1.1). 
Countries buying defense articles or services through the FMS program pay an amount 
equal to what the USG pays, plus an additional surcharge. This additional surcharge is 
charged by DSCA and is used to recoup the cost of administering the FMS program 
(DISAM, 2014, p. 65).  
FMS is a Security Assistance (SA) program managed by the DOD, through the 
DSCA. SA and Security Cooperation (SC) are two separate programs by which the 
United States can provide defense articles, services, and military training to partner 
nations. While SC and SA activities are similar, the statutes that authorize and fund them 
differ (DSCA, 2012, p. C1.1.2). All of the SC and SA activities support U.S. national 
security objectives and build partnerships with foreign nations (DSCA, 2012, p. C1.1.2). 
FMS is an SA activity that provides military articles, training, construction, and other 
services to foreign governments through cash sales, grants, loans, credit, or lease (DSCA, 
2012, p. C1.1.2.2).  
 6 
The FMS program is authorized and funded mainly by three separate laws: the 
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, 
and the Annual Appropriation Acts for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs. According to the FAA, AECA, and Executive Order 13637, “the 
Department of State (DOS) is responsible for continuous supervision and general 
direction of Security Assistance programs” (DSCA, 2012, p. C1.3.1). The DOS 
determines if there will be a program or sale for a specific nation, the size and scope of 
military training, and budget requests and allocation of funds for military assistance. The 
DOS also reviews and approves export license requests for Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) of defense articles (DSCA, 2012, p. C1.3.1). The DSCA summarizes the FMS 
program as follows: 
The Secretary of Defense [SECDEF] establishes military requirements and 
implements programs to transfer defense articles and services to eligible 
foreign countries and international organizations. Within DOD, the 
principal responsible agencies for Security Cooperation (SC) are the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Combatant 
Commands (CCMDs), the Joint Staff, the Security Cooperation 
Organizations (SCOs), and the Military Departments (MILDEPs). (DSCA, 
2012, p. C1.3.2) 
2. History of Foreign Military Sales 
The FMS program is one of many SA programs. SA programs came to fruition 
through several public laws, such as the Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1954, the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, and the Arms Export Control Act (DISAM, 2015, p. 2–2). The 
current provisions of the FAA and AECA are a progression of earlier acts or laws. The 
FAA had many of the same provisions found within the MSA. The FAA is the 
authorizing legislation for the FMS program, International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Foreign Military 
Financing Program (FMFP), and others (DISAM, 2015, p. 2–1). 
The AECA stemmed from the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) of 1968. The 
authority for the FMSA was the FAA, which sought to incorporate foreign military sales 
in a new, separate act. Subsequently, the International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976 changed the title from FMSA to AECA. The AECA also 
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established authority for commercial licensing through the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR; DISAM, 2015, p. 2–2). Figure 1 shows the major security assistance 
authorization acts since 1954 and their relationship to the current FMS program. 
Figure 1.  Major Security Assistance Authorization Acts Since 1954 
 
Source: Grafton, J. S. (Ed.). (2015, June 1). The management of security cooperation 
(34th ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute for Security Assistance 
Management, p. 2-2 
B. SUPPORT AGENCIES 
The FMS process is complex and requires oversight and coordination from 
several organizations. The DSCA is the DOD’s lead agency for FMS, with comparable 
organizations for each of the military services. As this study is focused solely on the 
Army FMS program, the organizations described are limited to those DOD and Army 
organizations involved. 
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1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
The DSCA “directs, administers, and provides guidance to the DOD 
Components and DOD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DOD SC 
programs” (DSCA, n.d.-a). The DSCA serves under the Assistant Security of Defense for 
Policy (ASD(P)), shown in Figure 2, and is responsible for managing defense trade and 
arms transfer, humanitarian assistance, international education, and training and defense 
institution building programs (DSCA, n.d.-a). The DSCA’s mission, vision, and principle 
functions are as follows: 
Mission 
Lead the Security Cooperation community (SCC) in developing and 
executing innovative security cooperation solutions that support mutual 
U.S. and partner interests (DSCA, n.d.-a).  
Vision 
Enable a whole-of-government effort to build and maintain networks of 
relationships that achieve U.S. national security goals. (DSCA, n.d.-a) 
Principle Functions 
• Administering and supervising SA planning and programs  
• Coordinating the formulation and execution of SA programs with other 
governmental agencies  
• Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign 
countries  
• Serving as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry with regard to 
SA activities  
• Managing the credit-financing program  
• Developing and promulgating SA procedures, such as the SAMM  
• Developing and operating the data processing system and maintaining the 
macro database for the SA program  
• Making determinations with respect to the allocation of FMS administrative 
funds  
• Administering assigned security cooperation programs  
• Administering the implementation of any assigned security force assistance 
(SFA) activities. (DISAM, 2015, pp. 3–12) 
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Figure 2.  U.S. Government Organization for Security Cooperation and 
Security Assistance 
 
Source: Grafton, J. S. (Ed.). (2015, June 1). The management of security cooperation 
(34th ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute for Security Assistance 
Management, p. 3-3. 
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Defense Exports, and 
Cooperation  
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Defense Exports, and Cooperation 
[DASA (DEC)] works directly for the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics and Technology [ASA (AL&T)] and provides “SA policy, oversight, and 
resourcing for the Department of the Army” (DISAM, 2015, p. 3–16). DASA (DEC) 
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provides oversight and support for the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
(USASAC), while implementing the Army’s strategic partnership goals. DASA (DEC) 
also serves as a conduit between DSCA and the Army’s implementing agency, USASAC, 
as shown in Figure 3, by providing “quality materiel, facilities, spare parts, training, 
publications, technical documentation, sustainment and other services that AMC provides 
to U.S. Army units” (U.S. Army Security Assistance Command [USASAC], 2015). The 
DASA (DEC) mission statement is as follows: 
To effectively transform the Army’s effort to proactively engage across 
the spectrum of security cooperation and have greater flexibility in 
satisfying changing global requirements. DASA DE&C is the U.S. Army 
lead for exports, technology transfer, armaments cooperation, and for 
equipping and training our international partners. Manage, lead and direct 
policy, resources, and strategy for the conduct of the Army’s global 
security cooperation programs with direct tasking authority over the 
Army’s designated Executive Agents for the execution of their delegated 
security cooperation responsibilities. (Assistant Secretary of the Army, 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology [ASA (ALT)], 2012) 
Figure 3.  DOD Security Assistance Organizations Relationships  
 
Source: United States Army Security Assistance Command. (2014, February 20). AUSA 
USASAC Focus Forum. Huntsville, AL: Author, p. 5. 
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3. United States Army Security Assistance Command 
The USASAC is the implementing agency for the U.S. Army’s FMS program and 
its role is “to build partner capacity, support geographic Combatant Command 
engagement strategies and strengthen U.S. global partnerships (USASAC, 2015). The 
USASAC functions as the executive agent for the Army Material Command (AMC) and 
“is responsible for life cycle management of FMS cases, from pre Letter of Request, to 
development, execution and closure” (USASAC, 2015). The USASAC manages 
approximately 5,000 FMS cases in more than 140 countries each year, and provides 
training to more than 11,000 foreign soldiers annually (see Figure 4). USASAC’s mission 
and vision statements are as follows: 
Mission  
USASAC leads the AMC Security Assistance Enterprise, develops and 
manages security assistance programs and foreign military sales cases to 
build partner capacity, supports COCOM engagement strategies, and 
strengthens U.S. global partnerships. 
Vision  
The Premier Security Assistance Enterprise in the Department of Defense. 
A highly professional, skilled, and values-based workforce that generates 
trust in advancing U.S. strategic partnerships through exceptional security 
assistance and FMS programs. (USASAC, 2015) 
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Figure 4.  Fiscal Year 2013 Army FMS Figures 
 
Source: United States Army Security Assistance Command. (2014, February 20). AUSA 
USASAC Focus Forum. Huntsville, AL: Author, p. 2. 
C. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
Foreign nations may purchase military equipment and services through two 
separate programs. First, FMS is a government-to-government sale of weapon systems, 
support, and services. Second, commercial vendors may sell weapon systems, support, 
and services through direct commercial sales (DCS). DCS and FMS are two separate 
processes, each of which will be explained in detail in this section. 
1. The FMS Process 
The FMS process is similar to the DOD acquisitions process. The FMS process is 
conducted in three phases: pre-case development; case development; and implementation, 
execution, and closure (DISAM, 2015, p. 5–2). Pre-case development usually begins 
when foreign countries conduct a capabilities analysis and determine that they have a 
specific military need. Once the foreign government identifies a need, it begins to 
research procurement options and sources. After the foreign nation evaluates its options, 
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it may realize that no domestic or non-U.S. organizations or industries exist that can 
provide its need. At that point, the foreign government may initiate contact with the USG 
to procure defense articles, training, or services from U.S. sources, which could be 
obtained through commercial sources, through Direct Commercial Sales, or through the 
FMS program administered by the DOD and the DOS. 
The FMS process begins by determining a country’s eligibility to receive 
assistance through the FMS program. Table 1 identifies the four eligibility criteria that 
each country must meet in order to be eligible for FMS. Generally, defense articles are 
sold to foreign defense organizations that are under the control of a defense ministry. 
Additionally, a foreign defense establishment may only obtain the defense articles and 
services with prior approval from the DOS and DSCA. An eligibility determination is not 
a guarantee that a sale or transfer of defense articles will occur. Although a sale may be 
made, requirements of law or policy may prohibit the release of some items. 
Additionally, a sale of defense articles to a country may be stopped if certain social or 
security criteria are not met. This could include things such as unnecessary military 
expenditures, support to terrorists, illicit drug production or trafficking, default in 











Table 1.   FMS Eligibility Criteria 
 
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (2012, April 30). Security assistance 
management manual. Arlington, VA: Author, p. C4.1.1. 
Once the foreign country’s eligibility is verified, the USG determines the amount 
of defense articles to be released, as well as the form of payment—cash, credit, lease, or 
other. All foreign governments must agree not to transfer defense articles, services, or 
related training to any other country without prior consent of the DOS. They must also 
agree to use the defense articles as intended, whether for legitimate self-defense, internal 
security, or to hinder the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.  
Like the USG, foreign nations generally prefer to compete the procurement of 
weapons systems, defense articles, training, and construction. This is typically done 
through a Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Information (RFI), Invitation for Bid 
(IFB), or other formal request. The foreign nation may solicit RFIs from domestic or 
international markets. The foreign nation evaluates the proposals from both U.S. and 
Non-U.S. vendors and selects the offers that most closely meet its needs (DSCA, 2012, p. 
C4.3.1.1). When a foreign nation releases a solicitation through the appropriate channels, 
either the combatant commands (COCOMs) or the U.S. embassy in their country, the 
USG determines that solicitation to be a Letter of Request (LOR). DSCA reviews the 
# FMS Eligibility Criteria 
1 
The President finds that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to such country or 
international organization will strengthen the security of the United States (U.S.) and promote world 
peace; 
2 
The country or international organization has agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any 
defense article or related training or other defense service so furnished to it or produced in a 
cooperative project, to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or international 
organization, and not to use or permit the use of such an article or related training or other defense 
service for purposes other than those for which furnished, unless the consent of the President 
(Department of State) has first been obtained; 
3 
The country or international organization has agreed that it shall maintain the security of such article 
or service and provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such article by 
the U.S.; and 
4 The country or international organization is otherwise eligible to purchase or lease defense articles or defense services. 
Source: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) section 505(a) (22 U.S.C. 2314), and AECA section 
3(a) (22 U.S.C. 2753). !
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LOR, which initiates a process to determine if the USG should participate in the 
competition. The USG’s participation could be through FMS, DCS, an International 
Cooperative Agreement, or combination of these programs (DSCA, 2012, p. C4.3.1.1). 
Once the DSCA reviews and approves the LOR, the DSCA Case Writing 
Division (CWD) writes the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). After congressional 
notification is complete, the LOA is sent to the foreign defense ministry. The LOA is a 
formal offer from the USG to the foreign nation. If the foreign nation approves, the LOA 
is returned with an initial deposit to the Defense Finance and Accounting Services 
(DFAS)-Indianapolis. After DFAS receives the funds, a trust is established where funds 
are used as needed to pay for the articles or services. After the trust is established, the 
foreign nation can begin ordering articles, services, and training. The articles are then 
shipped, the services performed, or the training conducted. Two years after all articles, 
services, and training have been delivered or performed, the DFAS reconciles the records 
and submits the final bill to the customer, and the DSCA sends a closure certificate to 
DFAS. 
2. Direct Commercial Sales vs. Foreign Military Sales 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) allows foreign nations or customers to purchase 
defense articles, weapon systems, services, or training directly from defense contractors. 
DCS varies from FMS as the customer can go directly to the vendor without going 
through the USG. While the end result may be the same, the two methods of procuring 
defense articles or services vary. 
FMS is a government-to-government relationship, whereas DCS is a traditional 
buyer-seller relationship. Using DCS to purchase articles or services, however, may not 
be approved if certain conditions are present. If the customer prefers and the situation 
permits, DCS may be used in lieu of FMS. Typically, DCS results in providing the 
military equipment or services faster. Although the process of obtaining those goods and 
services is generally quicker, the foreign nation will usually pay a higher price than had 
they used the FMS program. The FMS program sells the military equipment and services 
at the same price the USG would pay. Additionally, some vendors prefer FMS over DCS 
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as they are selling the military equipment and services to the USG and therefore need 
only adhere to U.S. law. Vendors who directly sell military equipment and services to a 
foreign nation are subject to that nation’s laws and regulations. There are several other 
situations that might require one method over the other, which is discussed in greater 
detail in the following sections.  
The USG prefers that foreign nations procure U.S.-made defense articles or 
services, but by law must remain neutral when it comes to the procurement method used 
by foreign nations. The USG government is not allowed to promote the military 
equipment or services it procures to foreign nations. The USG will not provide foreign 
governments a LOA if there is a DCS sale in progress, pending, or being negotiated. The 
USG’s policy is not to compete with U.S. defense contractors or industry for foreign 
defense sales. Both FMS and DCS permit a foreign nation to purchase most military 
equipment or defense articles from the United States.  
The method by which a customer purchases military equipment can depend on 
several factors. First, FMS-only sales are those where technology, security, and other 
concerns are present. Next, sales of new or complex weapon systems may require FMS 
licensing. Additionally, the sale of any technology or ammunition, whether complex or 
not, that requires increased control to prevent proliferation from terrorist organizations or 
rogue states requires licensing. Finally, sales of weapons systems may be made through 
both FMS and DCS channels. The separation of a weapons system into FMS and DCS 
components or end items allows customers to purchase only those components that must 
be transferred through the FMS process. Ultimately, the President of the United States 
(POTUS) has the discretion as to which weapons systems will be sold exclusively 
through the FMS process (DISAM, 2015, p. 15–2). 
A U.S. defense contractor may request that the sale of defense articles or training 
be made using DCS rather than FMS. If the foreign nation prefers that the sale be made 
through DCS, the U.S. defense contractor submits the proposal to DSCA. Once DSCA 
approves the DCS preference, the item managers, security cooperation offices (SCOs), 
and other USG offices are notified. The foreign purchaser is also notified of the DCS 
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preference approval and advised to contact the U.S. defense contractor directly (DISAM, 
2015, p. 15–3). 
The purchase of a major weapons system by a foreign nation is not the end of the 
DCS or FMS process. Major weapons systems require life-cycle support to ensure their 
operational utility over their useful life. This support could come through either FMS or 
DCS channels. Even if a sale were made through FMS, the supporting equipment, 
services, or training could come through DCS. Conversely, sales made via DCS could 
rely on life-cycle support procured through FMS (DISAM, 2015, p. 15–4). 
The USG is involved in both FMS and DCS sales. In both cases Congress is 
notified if the threshold dollar value is exceeded. In both FMS and DCS defense sales the 
DOS is the final approving authority (DISAM, 2015, p. 15–5). In FMS cases, DSCA 
contacts DOS to begin a new FMS case, while in DCS the contractor must have an export 
license approved by DOS. In either case, the sale of defense articles or services to a 
foreign nation must promote U.S. interests and policy. 
3. GAO and CBO Reports Concerning FMS 
The AECA was enacted in 1976; since then, there have been many Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports 
concerning various aspects of FMS or various defense articles sold through FMS. The 
scope of this study is limited to Army FMS articles, services, or training, and thus this 
study relies only on reports focused on the U.S. Army and DOD. 
In May 1976, the CBO produced two working papers to identify cost savings 
obtained through FMS and to identify the economic effects of FMS on the United States. 
These working papers were meant to describe how cost savings are obtained, the typical 
amount of saving, the types of programs that saw cost saving, and the economic as well 
as secondary effects of FMS, such as reduced weapons cost for the USG. These two 
working papers are the only reports that focused on the cost avoidance, cost savings, and 
the economic benefits of the FMS program as a whole. 
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The working paper titled Foreign Military Sales and U.S. Weapons Costs found 
that, for the most part, FMS did not produce significant cost savings. The CBO also 
found that reduced requirements on the U.S. military were hard to measure and that 
military weapons and technology sales were greatest to the Middle East, which only 
complicated matters (Fifer, Shafer, Capra, & Mantel, 1976, p. viii). The CBO stated that 
FMS cost saving came from two primary sources: recovery of research and development 
(R&D) costs and lower per-unit production costs. The report also mentioned that 
maintaining a weapon system’s production line could be a third source of cost savings. 
Cost savings related to keeping the production line open are too difficult to measure, and 
depend on a number of assumptions. Additionally, there were also increased personnel 
costs related to the increasing number of FMS cases. The increased demand for FMS 
required additional personnel in order to facilitate the program (Fifer et al., 1976, p. 3). 
According to the working paper, only a few weapons systems resulted in savings, 
which could be as high as 15% of the total weapons procurement cost (Fifer et al., 1976, 
p. 8). The CBO found that the single largest area of savings was from R&D costs. These 
saving were up to 8% of a weapons system’s total R&D costs. The weapons programs 
that resulted in cost savings were usually sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapons 
programs such as missiles or aircraft (Fifer et al., 1976, p. 12). Additionally, these high-
tech weapons programs needed to sell articles through the FMS program within the first 
five years of full-rate production (FRP) in order to see any savings at all. Furthermore, 
the sales of ammunition, artillery, and other military equipment where R&D costs had 
been absorbed resulted in little or no savings. The working paper went on to state that the 
most significant cost savings attributable to the FMS program might accrue because the 
FMS strengthens foreign nations resulting in decreased requirements on the U.S. military. 
While this may be true, cost saving resulting from stronger foreign nations and reduced 
U.S. military requirements are extremely difficult to measure (Fifer et al., 1976, p. 13). 
In the second CBO working paper titled Budgetary Cost Savings to the 
Department of Defense Resulting from Foreign Military Sales, the CBO found that FMS 
delivered cost savings through five different categories. Those categories are R&D 
recoupment, economies of scale and learning curve effects, overhead, production line 
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gaps, and other (Capra, Schafer, & Renehan, 1976, p. ix). R&D recoupments are cost 
savings resulting from a surcharge that each foreign customer must pay when buying 
defense articles or weapons systems through FMS. Economies of scale and learning 
curve effects result in cost savings by reducing the per-unit production cost. Overhead 
costs are reduced as foreign customers pay for some of the overhead costs that may have 
otherwise been charged to the USG. Production line gaps are decreased when weapons 
systems or other defense articles are sold through the FMS program. This results in cost 
avoidance of production line termination and setup costs for the United States. Other cost 
savings could result when a foreign buyer assumes a portion of some cost that would 
have been paid by the USG. For example, this could be other nonrecurring costs such as 
building a new production facility (Capra et al., 1976, p. 5). 
The CBO determined that only some of the sales through the FMS program 
resulted in a cost savings for the United States. In fact, CBO’s analysis of 35 weapons 
programs, in fiscal years (FY) 1977–1981, determined that only 50% of FMS sales 
resulted in cost savings (Capra et al., 1976, p. 15). Sales of services, construction, and 
training did not usually result in a cost saving for the United States. For the sales that did 
generate cost saving, most of the savings were for R&D recoupment. For every dollar in 
sales, only 14 cents resulted in savings. Of those 14 cents, four cents were a result of 
R&D recoupments (Capra et al., 1976, pp. 15, 17). This working paper also 
acknowledged that high-tech weapons programs (such as missiles and aircraft) with 
significant R&D costs resulted in the majority of the cost savings from FMS. Other 
weapons systems or defense articles such as tanks and tracked vehicles, communications 
equipment, ammunition, and others resulted in either little or no cost savings. 
A GAO report titled Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales found that trade 
offsets reduced the amount of cost saving from FMS. An offset is defined as the 
“coproduction, licensed production, countertrade, subcontracting, and technology 
transfer—mandated by foreign governments as a condition of sale” (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 1984, p. 1). Offsets reduce the amount of cost saving as 
they enable a foreign country to expand its industrial base, to the detriment of the U.S. 
industrial base and U.S. jobs. Offsets may also force a U.S. defense contractor to 
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purchase supplies and materials from the foreign nation. Offsets result in infrastructure 
and technology investments by vendors in purchasing countries who are seeking to 
improve sustainable domestic military production capability.  (GAO, 1984, p. 2). These 
arrangements are directly coordinated between the foreign customer and the U.S. defense 
contractor. The USG is normally not involved in these types of agreements. 
Proponents of trade offsets claim that sales agreements would not be as numerous 
without some form of trade offsets. There are also some who claim that trade offsets, 
such as technology sharing, allow commonality of equipment, create U.S. jobs, and foster 
better relationships between the United States and our allies (GAO, 1984, p. 4). Trade 
offsets may increase foreign sales, generate U.S. jobs, improve the U.S. industrial base, 
and decrease the per-unit price of goods due to longer production runs. Critics claim that 
trade offsets increase the cost of international defense procurement, base source selection 
by foreign customers of defense articles and weapons systems on criteria other than cost 
and performance, and threaten national security and U.S. defense contractors by allowing 
foreign government’s access to new technology (GAO, 1984, pp. 5–6). Unfortunately, the 
data on trade offsets was not sufficient to make a definitive determination either way 
when this report was written in 1983. 
Another report by the GAO, DOD’s Stabilized Rate Can Recover Full Cost, found 
that the surcharge rate that the DOD applied to FMS, as of 1997, was not sufficient to 
recover the full cost of the executing the FMS program. The FMS program should 
operate as a no-profit, no-loss program by the USG. Therefore, the only costs above and 
beyond those of the military equipment, services, or training are those required by the 
USG to operate the FMS program. The GAO found that the existing rate was inadequate 
to cover all costs associated with executing the FMS program, specifically pension and 
post-retirement health benefits of civilian employees (GAO, 1997, p. 2). The report 
recommended a stabilized surcharge rate that would be applied to all foreign sales in 
order to cover the full cost of executing the FMS program over the long run. The Army 
undercharged foreign customers a total of $7.2 million dollars between FY 1992-1996 
(GAO, 1997, p. 9). 
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In the report Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring 
Program, the GAO (2000) found that end-use monitoring of defense articles sold to 
foreign nations was ineffective. The GAO (2000) found that field personnel were not 
adequately informed or trained in the end-use reporting requirements (p. 4). At the time 
the report was written in August 2000, the DOD sold various defense articles and military 
equipment to dozens of different countries, with each country and type of equipment 
having different requirements in terms of end-use monitoring. As such, the DOD, 
specifically DSCA, failed to issue the necessary guidance and standard on end-use checks 
to its field representatives (GAO, 2000, pp. 8–9). Without clear, definitive monitoring 
guidance, the DOD’s field representatives were unsure when and how to monitor the end-
use of defense articles and equipment in the country in which they operated. As a result, 
the DOD lacked the required information on whether or not foreign customers were 
properly using the defense articles and training provided to them through the FMS 
program. At the time of this report, the DOD lacked the necessary information required 
by the AECA because it failed to collect it (GAO, 2000, p. 8). This end-use information 
is valuable to Congress and to those involved in FMS, and COCOMs. 
A 2004 GAO report, Improved Army Controls Could Prevent Unauthorized 
Shipments of Classified Spare Parts and Items Containing Military Technology to 
Foreign Countries, stated that the Army did not have adequate controls when sending 
foreign customers classified spare parts or unclassified items that contained military 
technology when they were part of a blanket order. A blanket order is a resupply action 
taken by the foreign government to purchase spare parts and other items for a specific 
dollar amount (GAO, 2004, p. 3). As part of these blanket orders, the Army must ensure 
that every item sent to the foreign customer is approved for transfer to that country. The 
GAO found that in some cases classified spare parts or items containing military 
technology were erroneously sent to foreign customers who were not approved to receive 
them. DOD policy does not allow for classified items to be transferred or released to a 
foreign customer under a blanket order. Furthermore, the GAO found that the Army 
failed to test the system used to ensure that countries were only receiving those items for 
which they had been approved. Additionally, the GAO (2004) found that the Army 
 22 
lacked written standards that defined the recovery of classified items or military 
technology once a foreign country received them (p. 9). 
In the 2009 report, Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for 
Exported Items and Information for Oversight, the GAO found that the DOD, DOS, and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lacked the necessary tools, policies, and 
procedures to effectively manage the FMS program (p. 2). On several occasions, FMS 
shipments were sent to foreign customers after the FMS cases were terminated. In these 
cases, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) authorized FMS shipments to proceed after they 
had been cancelled. In another example, the DOD adjusted the surcharge rate on foreign 
sales without knowing if the new rate would cover all the administrative costs of 
executing the FMS program (GAO, 2009, p. 3). Finally, DSCA did not have adequate 
metrics that it could use to improve the FMS agreement development timeline. DSCA 
policy states that the all FMS sales agreements should be completed in 120 days or 
earlier. The GAO found that between January 2003 and September 2008, only 72% of 
FMS sales agreements were complete in 120 days or less. The GAO also found that sales 
agreement completion times ranged from less than one day to 1,622 days (GAO, 2009, p. 
18). 
The GAO had previously investigated the FMS program focusing on a variety of 
issues, some of which were stated earlier in this paper, and found that shipment issues 
were ongoing. DSCA is responsible for monitoring, tracking, and reporting deliveries of 
each shipment (GAO, 2009, p. 12). In most cases the shipments are sent by the USG to 
the country’s freight service for shipment to their final destination. In other cases, foreign 
countries utilize the DOD’s defense transportation system to ship military equipment. 
Regardless of the shipping method used, the DSCA failed to effectively track receipt of 
shipments. As previously mentioned, the DOD lacked the required information necessary 
to adequately report on end-use monitoring. The DOD also failed to obtain the necessary 
information needed to determine the FMS program’s administrative costs. Additionally, 
the DOD did not conduct sufficient analysis in order to apply the proper surcharge rate 
needed to cover the administrative costs of running the FMS program (GAO, 2009, p. 
20).  
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D. DEFINITIONS  
In the subsequent section we define and explain key terms and concepts. These 
concepts include economic learning curve, economies of scale, overhead, and other 
concepts. The salience of these concepts became apparent through the course of this 
study. We define them here for clarity. 
1. Learning Curve 
The learning curve is simply defined as the rate at which the time or cost of 
performing a task decreases as the production output doubles. According to the Defense 
Manufacturing Management Guide, “Learning curve theorizes that people and 
organizations learn to do things more efficiently when performing repetitive tasks” 
(DMMG, n.d., para. 9.8.1). Learning curves were loosely defined by Ebbinghaus in the 
19th century in the study of psychology and learning, but then later explained by 
Wright’s Cumulative Average Model in his 1936 report “Factors Affecting the Cost of 
Airplanes” published in the Journal of Aeronautical Science. Wright’s research found a 
nonlinear relationship between direct labor hours and learning, and determined that 
“direct labor hours decreased as companies experience learning” (“Quantitative Module 
E: Learning Curves,” 2015). In 1947, Crawford confirmed Wright’s research and further 
developed the Unit Curve Model, which “states that as the quantity of a product produced 
doubles, the recurring cost per unit decreases at a fixed rate or constant percentage” 
(Barber, 2011). Wright and Crawford’s models remain relevant in the manufacturing 
sector (Table 2) and have branched out to other business sectors, including “marketing, 








Table 2.   Example of Learning Curves 
 
Source: Cunningham, J. A. (1980). Using the learning curve as a management tool. IEEE 
Spectrum, 17(6), pp. 45–48. 
a. Cumulative Average Curve 
Wright’s model operates on the assumption that the “direct labor man-hours 
necessary to complete a unit of production will decrease by a constant percentage each 
time the production quantity is doubled” (DMMG, n.d., para 9.8.5). His model helps 
calculate simple problems and allows for quick estimations for continuous production 
lines. The formula for Wright’s Learning Curve Model is shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5.  Wright’s Learning Curve Model 
 
Source: Martin, J. R. (n.d.-a). The learning curve or experience curve. Retrieved from 
http://maaw.info/LearningCurveSummary.htm. 
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b. Incremental or Unit Curve 
Crawford’s model focuses on the “hours or cost involved in specific units of 
production and treats each lot as a separate reference point” (DMMG, n.d., para. 9.8.5). 
The unit curve model determines learning curve rates based on lots or batches rather than 
individual units. It also “predicts a higher cumulative total time to produce two or more 
units than cumulative average model, assuming the same learning rates for both models” 
(Rajan et al., 2008). The formula for Crawford’s model is depicted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6.  Crawford’s Model 
 
Source: Martin, J. R. (n.d.-a). The learning curve or experience curve. Retrieved from 
http://maaw.info/LearningCurveSummary.htm 
2. Economies of Scale and Overhead 
The concept of economies of scale is similar to learning curves in that while 
production output increases, the long run average production cost per unit decreases, as 
depicted in Figure 7 (Leiberman & Hall, 2000). Economies of scale demonstrate cost 
savings to an organization by allocating fixed costs over a larger number of products. 
Fixed costs are “costs that do not vary with the volume of business, such as property 
taxes, insurance, depreciation, security, and minimum water and utility fees” (DAU, n.d.-
c). In the case of the Apache and Shadow programs, we are able to estimate cost savings 
by developing cost curves using estimated overhead rates and program acquisition unit 
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cost (PAUC). Overhead is defined as any expense that is not related to direct labor and 
direct materials in the manufacturing process, or “indirect costs that support a particular 
function of the company” (DAU, n.d.-d). This is particularly important for cost savings in 
FMS because those overhead costs will be allocated over a larger base. This is also true 
in the recoupment of research and development (R&D) costs.  
Figure 7.  Economies of Scale 
 
Source: Martin, J. R. (n.d.-b). What are economies of scale? Retrieved from 
http://maaw.info/EconomiesOfScaleNote.htm 
3. Production Line Start/Stop Cost 
Production line start and stop costs are another cost avoidance factor associated 
with FMS. FMS is used to stabilize the industrial base of the United States by allowing 
production lines to remain open. Production demand for the USG is predicted through the 
budget and Congress, but may not provide enough demand to sustain a defense 
contractor’s production line. FMS is used to fill those gaps. The USG will use foreign 
demand to schedule production runs to prevent a line from stopping. The difficulty in 
estimating the cost avoidance associated with the start/stop of production line is 
determining when a lack of foreign demand would actually stop production and the 
company would divert resources to another project.  
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4. Performance Based Logistics 
Performance based logistics (PBL) represents cost savings to the government 
through shared sustainment costs. According to DAU, PBL is “an outcome-based product 
support strategy for the development and implementation of an integrated, affordable, 
product support package designed to optimize system readiness and meet the 
Warfighter’s requirements in terms of performance outcomes” (DAU, n.d.-e). Both the 
DOD 5000.01 and the DOD 5000.02 require the program manager to employ 
performance based logistics strategies to enhance operational availability and reduce 
overall cost. PBL may be implemented at the system level or at the component level. This 
decision is made based on an approved sustainment strategy from the program office.  
5. International Cooperative Programs 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guide Book (DAG), “an international 
cooperative program is any acquisition program or technology project that includes 
participation by one or more foreign nations, through an international agreement, during 
any phase of a system’s life cycle” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook [DAG], 2013, para. 
11.2.1). The DOD 5000.01 requires the program manager to consider international 
partnership at every phase of the acquisition process and leverage opportunities to reduce 
costs and increase interoperability with our allies. The DAG suggests that the decision 
process should consider the following: 
Demonstrated best business practices, including a plan for effective, 
economical, and efficient management of the international cooperative 
program; 
Demonstrated DOD Component willingness to fully fund their share of 
international cooperative program needs; 
The long-term interoperability and political-military benefits that may 
accrue from international cooperation; and 
The international program’s management structure as documented in the 
international agreement. The designated program manager (U.S. or 
foreign) is fully responsible and accountable for the cost, schedule, and 
performance of the resulting system. (DAG, 2013, para. 11.2.1.1) 
 28 
6. Cost Avoidance 
Cost avoidance as a general concept or term is relatively consistent in meaning for 
both government and industry. The DAU (n.d.-a) describes cost avoidance as a present 
action that is expected to decrease or eliminate costs in the future However, actions that 
create cost avoidance often do not directly affect profit and loss. This makes cost 
avoidance actions less tangible because they are not direct savings than can be reinvested 
(Ashenbaum, 2006). As related to FMS, cost avoidance is most associated with costs that 
the government is able to avoid because of additional orders. In general, the volume or 
additional unit orders created by FMS allows government prime contractors to fill in 
production gaps. This prevents production line shut down costs and avoids costly startup 
and verification costs when the government reorders in the future. 
7. Cost Savings 
In general, government and industry seem to agree about how cost savings are 
created. However, depending on perspective, the tangible dollars achieved from cost 
savings may belong to industry profit or government savings. In either end state, the 
origin of the value is the same. The DAU describes cost savings as an action that results 
in a reduction in the anticipated level of costs in order to achieve a specific objective 
(DAU, n.d.-b). From an industry perspective, cost savings are generally directly traceable 
to profits and losses and are a direct reduction in expenses based on some change in 
process, technology, or policy (Ashenbaum, 2006, p. 2). As related to FMS, cost savings 
are most likely generated by increased economies of scale and spreading fixed costs 
across a larger allocation base. A challenge in determining actual cost savings is based on 
which side of the negotiation is able to capture more of the value. Depending on the 
contract vehicle in place, such as a Firm Fixed Price contract, industry may not be 
obligated to disclose a reduction in their overhead rates or favorable cost improvements 
in the supply chain. In the case of Firm Fixed Price contracts, any cost savings created is 
likely to be captured as industry profit. On the other end of the spectrum, Cost Plus, 
contracts are more likely to create government cost savings, as all costs are reimbursable 
by the government. In the middle, Incentive contracts negotiate terms to split the benefit 
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of cost savings between industry profit and government savings. FMS can create savings; 
however, the particular contractual relationship between the government and industry 
determines who receives the tangible or spendable benefit. 
8. Public Value 
In the mid-1990s, Moore (1995) wrote extensively about the concept of public 
value. He specifically compared and contrasted techniques and methods that private 
industry managers and government managers used to assess the value they had created 
for their organizations (Moore, 1995, p. 28). The industry managers’ private value 
stemmed almost entirely from the posting of profits or losses. In contrast, government 
managers are responsible for coordinating and providing those essential services the 
public pays for through taxation. They consistently must provide the most benefit for the 
least cost through efficiently and effectively achieving legislated objectives (Moore, 
1995). These benefits include services such as national defense, policing, education, and 
emergency services. FMS produces public value in direct and indirect ways. From a 
defense perspective, selling capabilities to allied nations ensures that allies are capable 
partners. This potentially reduces manpower and fiscal requirements for the U.S. military 
in the future. FMS that creates cost avoidance is an example of a direct increase in public 
value. The sale has increased an allied nation’s defense capability, making them more 
capable partners and reducing dependence on the U.S. military, and thus avoiding large 
sums of capital expenditures. An example of indirect FMS public benefits may stem from 
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III. METHODS 
A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
We conducted a comparative case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) using 
two organizations representing the upper and the lower limits of Army FMS sales 
volume. The comparative case study method is a well-suited research approach for this 
FMS project. A case analysis is most useful when the researcher is answering how and 
why questions focused on contemporary events with no control over the associated 
behavior (Yin, 2009, p. 6). Designs that rely on analysis of archival or survey data allow 
researchers to focus on developing specific answers to who, what, where, and how many 
or how much types of questions, but are less well suited to exploring how and why. Case 
study analyses allow researchers to provide rich description and to focus on themes, 
patterns and processes that may not be evident in quantifiable data. This study describes 
the value to the government generated by FMS and also explores why and how this value 
is created (Yin, 2009, p. 3).  
B. CASE SELECTION 
The cases for this study were selected purposefully to yield information rich 
instances of the focal phenomena (Patton, 2002). This project’s case selections are 
homogenous in terms of organization structure and practices but represent extremes in 
terms of Army FMS sales volume. This selection limits the influence of organization 
structure and practices, allowing influences associated with sales volume to be more 
observable. DSCA’s online archived news releases were used to identify cases. DSCA’s 
news releases represent the required notification of Congress of a likely FMS. These 
news releases include an estimated dollar figure, a weapon description, and known or 
anticipated prime vendors (by location). The news releases do not represent actual sales 
from foreign nations; however, they do represent a demand signal. Thus, the news 
releases thus signal demand trends and provide a reasonable basis for case selection. 
We analyzed 378 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) news releases 
addressed to Congress, issued from 2008 to 2015, to identify trends at the DOD level and 
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Army levels. In order to conduct the analysis, we assigned a service and a set of weapon 
categories (see Table 3) to each news release. Additionally, we associated each news 
release with a dollar figure and prime contractors.  
Table 3.   FMS Weapon System Categories 
 
 
Previous studies of FMS conducted by CBO, developed 10 weapon categories. 
Additional weapon categories have been added to reflect current systems; however, 
services were accounted for but not considered for case selection. The CBO’s 1976 
analysis demonstrated a minimal amount of cost savings or avoidance created by the sale 
of services. Our first level of analysis focused on the entire DOD FMS program. From 
April 2008 to May 2015, DSCA notified Congress of approximately $292.6 trillion worth 
of expected FMS. The largest weapon category across this period was manned aircraft at 
$141.76 billion; conversely, the smallest was night vision at $330 million. Figure 8 
depicts each weapon category as a percentage of total DOD FMS demand from April 
2008 to May 2015, and Table 4 summarizes the potential sales volume by weapon 





















Figure 8.  DOD FMS Weapon System Demand Trend as Percent of Total 
FMS Demand 2008–2015 
 
 
Table 4.   DOD Total Potential Sales Volume by Major Weapon System 
Categories, April 2008 to May 2015 (in Millions) 
 
 
Our second level of analysis focused only on the Army FMS program. In total, 
from January 2008 to May 2015, the DSCA notified Congress of $150.7 trillion worth of 














Category # MAJOR Weapon Systems Category Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 Aircraft manned $141,763 $2,172 $13,347 $59,691 $11,188 $21,942 $16,124 $9,816 $7,483
2 Aircraft unmanned $3,525 $205 $63 $218 $0 $1,200 $1,500 $0 $339
3 Missiles/Bomb aircraft delivery $17,503 $980 $1,615 $602 $1,534 $1,574 $5,930 $2,639 $2,629
4 Missiles/Bomb ground delivery $45,205 $319 $9,185 $4,276 $493 $22,535 $4,095 $4,110 $192
5 C4ISR/Electronic Control Systems $22,722 $3,341 $2,880 $2,000 $2,312 $996 $75,730 $3,490 $130
6 Night Vision $330 $0 $0 $0 $330 $0 $0 $0 $0
7 Tanks and Tracked Vehicles $6,875 $2,160 $275 $0 $1,329 $0 $0 $2,641 $470
8 Wheeled Vehicles $9,737 $4,100 $0 $122 $646 $233 $900 $3,736 $0
9 Ammunition $1,294 $127 $0 $36 $820 $0 $54 $600 $395
10 Services $27,147 $383 $2,785 $2,439 $4,769 $3,272 $7,638 $3,990 $1,871
11 Weapon Systems $7,046 $510 $0 $966 $2,357 $538 $968 $140 $310
12 Ships $3,066 $1,010 $321 $105 $0 $0 $1,200 $350 $80
13 Military Construction $1,060 $0 $1,060 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
14 Other $610 $0 $75 $0 $200 $300 $35 $0 $0
15 FUEL $4,670 $0 $0 $2,000 $0 $0 $2,670 $0 $0
TOTAL $292,553 $15,307 $31,606 $72,455 $25,240 $52,590 $48,687 $32,769 $13,899
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aircraft at $68.8 trillion; conversely, the smallest was unmanned aircraft at $218 million. 
The unmanned aircraft system provides a more homogenous case to compare with 
Manned Aircraft. This homogeneity is caused by both weapon systems belonging to the 
same Army Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation. Figure 10 depicts each weapon 
category as percentage of total Army FMS demand from 2008 to 2015 and Table 5 
summarizes the potential sales volume by weapon category created by the demand for the 
same time period. 
Figure 9.  Army FMS Weapon System Demand Trend as Percent of Total 



























Table 5.   Total Army, FMS-Based Demand Dollar Figures from DSCA 
April 2008 to May 2015 Archives (in Millions) 
 
 
Based on an analysis of DSCA’s archival information, we selected the Army’s 
AH-64 Apache Helicopter to represent the high case and the Army’s RQ-7B TUAS 
Shadow to represent the low case for this comparative case study. 
C. DATA SOURCES AND DATA  
This study relied on a variety of both qualitative and quantitative data. Data was 
collected using in-person interviews, telephone interviews, an industry site visit, 
publication searches, Internet searches, and through direct support and interaction with 
program offices in the U.S. Army PEO Aviation. We conducted eleven interviews with 
government and industry leaders at the executive level. Government officials ranged from 
GS-13 to Lieutenant General (RET). Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 60 
minutes. We conducted electronic database searches to collect historical documents from 
the GAO, CBO, and past student MBA projects related to FMS. We used the DSCA’s 
online archive to find documents describing the FMS process and historical news release 
documents indicating a potential sale to another nation. These collection efforts and data 
sources are summarized in Table 6. 
  
Category # MAJOR Weapon Systems Category Total 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 Aircraft manned $68,837 $144 $6,465 $42,091 $217 $9,430 $665 $5,944 $2,583
2 Aircraft unmanned $218 $0 $0 $218 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
3 Missiles/Bomb aircraft delivery $2,418 $0 $577 $0 $65 $186 $0 $1,452 $138
4 Missiles/Bomb ground delivery $44,876 $319 $9,040 $4,160 $443 $22,517 $4,095 $4,110 $192
5 C4ISR/Electronic Control Systems $5,055 $485 $560 $841 $433 $428 $2,218 $90 $0
6 Night Vision $330 $0 $0 $0 $330 $0 $0 $0 $0
7 Tanks and Tracked Vehicles $6,875 $2,160 $275 $0 $1,329 $0 $0 $2,641 $470
8 Wheeled Vehicles $9,504 $4,100 $0 $122 $646 $0 $900 $3,736 $0
9 Ammunition $1,294 $127 $0 $36 $82 $0 $54 $600 $395
10 Services $5,110 $0 $410 $538 $120 $1,770 $840 $1,432 $0
11 Weapon Systems $5,146 $510 $0 $647 $2,134 $0 $885 $970 $0
12 Ships $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
13 Military Construction $1,060 $0 $1,060 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
14 Other $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
15 FUEL $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
TOTAL $150,723 $9,143 $18,387 $48,653 $5,799 $34,331 $9,657 $20,975 $3,778
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Table 6.   FMS Project DATA Summary Table 
 
 
Type Name File Quantity/Unit









































































D. ANALYSIS APPROACH 
We began our analysis by conducting a review of available historical data. This 
focused initially on GAO reports, CBO reports, and past Naval Postgraduate School 
MBA projects. Based on the historical research, we added public value as an element of 
FMS. The majority of the historical documents discussed FMS primarily in accounting 
terms, but did not mention the less tangible benefits associated with public value that 
FMS creates. 
We next attempted to verify trends in FMS analysis conducted by the CBO in the 
early 1970s. To do this, we used similar weapon categories and added categories to 
reflect the nearly 40 years of technological growth. Using DSCA’s archived data from 
April 2008 to May 2015, we analyzed FMS demand trends. The trends indicated which 
states likely received the most benefit from FMS, which weapon categories were likely to 
have the largest and smallest sales volume, and which companies were associated with 
FMS and to what extent. These trends allowed us to determine our high and low cases for 
comparison. 
We conducted a within and between case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). We focused 
initially on each individual case to determine the program’s strategy related to FMS, 
determining the sources of cost savings and cost avoidance and then analyzing the 
strategy’s effect on those sources. After analyzing within each case, we then compared 
between the cases. The comparison focused on the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the two program’s FMS strategies. We identified trends, opportunities, and 
implications that may exist when future FMS cases are considered and developed an 
initial framework, depicted in Figure 10.  
As is typical of qualitative analysis, we then iterated between our initial model, 
the data and literature to further refine the model and identify recommendations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). The initial framework suggested the importance of the 
role played by program strategy in trends and opportunities. We focused subsequent 
investigation on identifying sources of cost savings and cost avoidance and analyzing the 
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effect of the program’s FMS strategy on the sources. We describe the initial framework 
and present and describe the elaborated model in subsequent sections of this paper.  
Figure 10.  Foreign Military Sales Comparative Case Study Approach 
 
 
In order to analyze each program’s strategy, we used qualitative data collection 
methods such as interviews and examining working documents. Determining sources of 
cost savings and cost avoidance was more of a blended effort between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Collectively the data was used to determine sources of cost savings 




IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
We conducted a between and within case analysis. Our analysis shows that FMS 
continues to be a strategic tool for the United States Government to equip our 
international partners and protect US interests around the globe. Our analysis identified 
four key sources of cost savings and cost avoidance: economies of scale, sustainment, 
production line gap, and international cooperative partners. We find that FMS cases 
generally increase public value based on the net outcome of all cost avoidance, 
government cost savings, and industry profit associated with each case. We find that in 
FMS case execution, programs are limited by quantity uncertainties and contractual 
limitations created by case timing and are limited in their ability to implement deliberate 
business strategies. The specific evidence for each source of cost savings and cost 
avoidance is not publicly releasable due to security and proprietary concerns. In order to 
demonstrate the nature of these sources, the program data is converted either into 
percentages or averages. This protects the companies and countries involved, while 
presenting evidence for particular claims. Chapter IV is divided into three sections. The 
first section describes each case and analyzes the sources of cost savings and cost 
avoidances. The second section compares the two cases and articulates findings. Finally, 
the third section illustrates an enfolding analysis and related findings.  
A. CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS  
Our within case analysis describes the strategy and sources of cost savings and 
costs avoidance in both the Shadow and Apache programs. These programs represent the 
low and high cases in the study based on dollar values from congressional notifications. 
This provides a purposeful selection of data to facilitate generalizations in findings. This 
analysis identifies sources of cost savings and cost avoidance for each program created 
by FMS cases. 
1. Shadow 
The Shadow is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) utilized in operational theaters 
as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset. The Shadow is produced 
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by AAI Corporation and is operated by both the U.S. Army and the Marine Corp. Since 
2000, AAI has produced more than 100 Shadow systems that have flown over 750,000 
mission hours in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Shadow represents the low example in our 
case study with only two systems sold to one foreign partner. It will be analyzed based on 
its FMS strategy and sources of cost savings and cost avoidance.  
The Program Manager for Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
characterizes the program’s FMS strategy as execution based. This suggests that the 
program does not incorporate FMS into production planning, because of the small 
volume of external sales. This limited business strategy is demonstrated by a single 
foreign customer and no anticipated foreign customers to benefit the program. The 
customer requested two Shadows that had already been produced by AAI Corporation. 
The USG was able to sell the two systems at cost. Currently, a technology restriction is in 
place as part of the U.S. security strategy, which dictates what countries can purchase the 
Shadow systems. The program office’s ability to anticipate future sanctioned sales is 
constrained based on a limited awareness of the security cooperation strategy. This 
directly affects their ability to capture value from FMS and to build a comprehensive 
strategy that leads to cost savings and cost avoidance.  
The Shadow’s FMS sales are currently 1.6% of the total units in operation and 
accounts for the same savings in sustainment costs. The FMS customer pays a 
proportionate amount of the total PBL costs along with the Marine Corps (11%) and the 
Army (87.4%). This payment represent cost savings to the government because the 
Army’s portion of the PBL contract would increase to 89% of the total PBL costs if those 
units had not been sold. The savings may seem low in percentage value, but over the life 
of the system attribute to significant cost savings.  
The Shadow program has not dealt with production line gap problems in the past, 
but is foreseeing one in the future. The last new Shadow was built in 2011 and since then, 
the production line’s capacity has been used to upgrade the Shadow from version 1 to 
version 2. The current plan is to complete upgrades by 2019, but the replacement for the 
Shadow does not meet its initial operational capabilities (IOC) until 2028. The program 
will attempt to leverage FMS to fill the nine year gap between products. This would lead 
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to cost avoidance by preventing the USG from paying initial startup and associated 
learning costs.  
As the low case in this study, Shadow realizes cost savings through its PBL 
strategy and may attain cost avoidances in the future by ensuring the production line stays 
open. The program office accomplishes this through an execution based strategy that 
leverages the additional system’s maintenance requirements to capture value for the 
USG. Government captured value may not be a large percentage of the overall cost, but 
represents large savings over the total life of the program.  
2. Apache Attack Helicopter 
The Apache helicopter is the U.S. Army’s primary attack helicopter and 
represents our high case in the case study. The Apache program has sold hundreds of 
helicopters to more than five different countries and is one of the largest manned aircraft 
programs that participates in FMS. This program is analyzed based on its FMS strategy 
and sources of cost savings and cost avoidances.  
Apache’s FMS strategy can be characterized as opportunity-based. This strategy 
facilitates partnerships and cooperation among its foreign partners and is evident in the 
approximately 15 current cooperative projects. The Apache program also seeks to 
leverage the increased volume of FMS to provide value to the government at each stage 
of the acquisition life cycle. Currently, Apache attempts to gain flexibility on production 
contracts but does not possess the ability to predict accurate demand quantities. This 
forces the Apache program to be reactionary in gaining savings for the government in 
terms of production and sustainment. A large part of Apache’s strategy is capitalizing on 
foreign partner support for technology early in the acquisition process. This allows the 
program to capture value by developing technology and providing commonality and 
interoperability for our allied partners in the future.  
The Apache program office leverages FMS through economies of scale, 
sustainment functions, production line gap, and cooperative developments. Economies of 
scale is possible through Apache FMS because of the substantial increased volume in 
sales. Cost savings and cost avoidances overlap in this instance but are seen through 
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learning rates, re-allocation of overhead and common labor as well as reduction in direct 
material costs. 
The Apache production office uses the additional quantities from FMS to increase 
cost savings associated with learning and experience. The learning curve rate on the 
Model E is 90%. This suggests that every time the production quantity doubles, the labor 
hours decrease by 10%. The learning rates have a definite effect on direct labor cost 
through labor and process efficiencies. Apache realizes the most cost savings at the 
beginning of the production timeline, but also uses these rates for a modest effect at the 
end of the production period. The first 60 Model E aircraft were purchased by FMS 
customers, prior to the USG purchasing eight. On average, this saved the government 
5816 labor hours per aircraft. According to Boeing’s public website, the average 
aircraft/plant mechanic makes $25 an hour. Thus, the USG saved an estimated $1.16 
million on the first eight aircrafts it produced. Over the total production of the Model E 
Apache, the USG realized a 31% or $2.2 million cost savings from direct labor.  
Cost savings and avoidances are also realized through the re-allocation of 
overhead and common labor costs. A re-opener clause in the Apache contract clause 
allows the government to capture these costs for the benefit of the government through 
the Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA). Overhead rates that are negotiated 
through the contracting process are based on a certain volume of production. If 
production volume changes and the government has a re-opener clause, the government 
can renegotiate rates based on the new production volume. This is also true for common 
labor pools. Large government contractors have employees that work on multiple 
contracts. If production volume increase, the government, through the re-opener clause, 
can re-allocate those cost to account for FMS.  
The increased quantity of sales from FMS allow the government to take 
advantage of economic order quantities (EOQ). This is done through contractor direct 
materials and government furnished equipment (GFE). Capturing cost savings from the 
contractor on direct material is relatively the same as described in the previous section. 
This must be done through a re-opener clause in the production contract by DCAA. 
DCAA has reopened the contract and negotiated economic order quantity discounts 
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taking into account the increase in sales. The government also seeks EOQ discounts from 
government vendors that provide GFE as part of the aircraft build. The new sales allow 
the government to purchase components at a cheaper rate adding to the increase in cost 
savings. . 
Additional sources of cost savings and avoidance for the Apache program are 
captured through the program’s logistics strategy. A combined logistics strategy allows 
the program to leverage increased volumes of common spare parts as well experience. 
This decreases the overall sustainment cost for the USG and increases the availability of 
spare parts. The Apache program uses its Model D and Model E aircrafts to develop 
“common configuration” upgrades. These upgrades remove variations in the aircrafts and 
produces efficiencies for both hardware and software maintenance. For example, in the 
previous versions of the Apache, international customers had different software and 
hardware packages. This made the sustainment system more complex and expensive to 
maintain. By reducing variability and increasing standardization in the programs, Apache 
has experience increased cost savings and cost avoidances.  
Over the history of the Apache program, FMS has kept the production line open 
twice. These two occurrences represent enormous cost avoidances to the government. If 
Apache did not have FMS customers, Boeing would have shut down the production line. 
This would have a tremendous effect on the U.S. industrial base and would also force the 
USG to incur estimated average startup cost of $35 million to resume production.  
International partners allow the USG to build capabilities and improve technology 
at a fraction of the price. This is done through capability enhancement partnerships and 
International Cooperative Research, Development and Acquisition (ICRDA). The 
Apache program experiences cost savings through partnerships with FMS customers to 
develop and test new capabilities called technology insertion. These countries may desire 
new technology that is not funded, or they may want this capability sooner than what 
their budget allows. When this happens, the countries give the USG funds to develop and 
test this capability. The Apache office has saved approximately $101.5 million on more 
than five projects that have increased the operational effectiveness of the Apache. The 
Apache program also has one ICRDA partner. This relationship is defined by a mutually 
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agreeable Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and generates cost savings through 
R&D efficiencies and shared costs. By the end of 2016, the USG and its partner will have 
completed approximately fifteen projects to improve or augment the Apache program. 
These projects range from increased personnel safety to enhanced weapons capabilities. 
These foreign partnerships allow the USG to develop technology at a significant 
reduction in price and provide new capabilities to the operational force. 
The Apache is one of the largest FMS products in the Army and realizes cost 
savings and cost avoidance in multiple areas across the acquisition life cycle. Cooperative 
projects and economies of scale together create the largest volume of cost savings. Cost 
avoidance is difficult to estimate, but the sources of cost avoidances are through a 
combined logistics strategy, common configuration, and production line gaps. Overall, 
the Apache program, through its opportunity-based FMS strategy has captured significant 
value for the USG.  
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
1. Analysis 
FMS strategies for the Shadow and Apache are extremely different in terms of 
planning and execution. Since Shadow only has one customer, their strategy is to execute 
as effectively as possible without deliberately planning to generate any value to the 
government. In comparison, the Apache has multiple customers and uses increased 
volume sales to generate considerable value to the government. They do this through 
contracting mechanisms (re-opener clause) and capability enhancement partnerships. 
Both programs are hampered by the lack of ability to anticipate future demand and are 
constrained by contractual limitations based on case timing. The Apache program has 
attempted to create some flexibility using their contracting strategy to capture more value 
from FMS.  
The Apache program captures substantially more value in the form of cost savings 
and cost avoidances than the Shadow program. Currently, Shadow demonstrates only one 
source of cost savings, whereas Apache exhibits eight sources of cost savings and cost 
avoidances. Both programs experience savings in sustainment, but Shadow realizes little 
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savings through PBL in comparison to Apaches mixed logistics approach and common 
configuration upgrades. Production line gap is a consideration for both programs. This 
was a reality for Apache in the past, while Shadow is preparing for it in the future. The 
Apache and Shadow continue to operate in exceedingly different environment while 
seeking to supply their individual products as efficiently and effectively as possible to 
their foreign partners. 
Common to both cases was an inability to characterize the total value created by 
an FMS case. The values in both cost avoidance and cost savings were estimated without 
direct access to industry profit or overhead figures. Based on contractual relationships 
industry partners in both programs were not obligated to share overhead rates or specific 
profit information based on proprietary rights. Therefore, a determination of the total 
value created by an FMS case is unknown making it difficult to determine how much of 
the value is actually captured by government versus industry. 
2. Findings 
The within and between case analyses of the Apache and Shadow programs 
illustrate the depth of opportunity created by FMS. Though the total value created 
through FMS may not be entirely clear, the analysis shows that increased cost savings 
and cost avoidances are captured by the USG. We used the comparative case study 
approach model, developed in the literature review, to identify three groups of findings: 
sources of cost savings and cost avoidance, public value framework and findings from 
enfolding analysis. 
a. Sources of Cost Savings and Costs Avoidance 
Three categories of cost savings and cost avoidance are evident from our analysis: 
economies of scale, sustainment and international cooperative programs as shown in 
Figure 11. Cost savings are realized savings that, potentially, can be reinvested, while 
cost avoidances are decisions made now that reduce cost expenditures in the future. 
These sources of cost savings and cost avoidance are only captured through intentional 
planning during the early phases of the acquisition life cycle. 
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Figure 11.  Sources of Cost Avoidance and Savings 
 
 
(i) Economies of Scale 
The added volume of sales in the Apache program led to cost savings through 
learning curve rates, overhead or common labor, and direct materials. The Apache 
production contract reopener clauses allowed the government to renegotiate rates and 
recoup savings. The Shadow program did not experience economies of scale due to the 
limited number of systems sold to their foreign partner. The research determined that the 
Apache program’s learning curve rate is 90% and is approximately $2.2 million in cost 
savings to the government. Apache airframes sold at the beginning of a production 
contract created more savings than those sold towards the end of the contract, resulting in 
the first eight apaches realizing 53% of the total savings. Overhead and common labor 
pools saw savings through reallocation over a larger product volume, while direct 
material costs were reduced through an EOQ. 
(ii) Sustainment 
Sustainment provides both cost savings and cost avoidances to the government. 
PBL saves costs for the Shadow in a limited capacity of 1.6% of total PBL expenditures. 
Apache leverages more sustainment opportunities through increased volume of sales and 
common spare parts. Costs are avoided through common configuration upgrades in 
hardware and software, allowing the USG to avoid future maintenance costs. The 
common configuration upgrades not only lower sustainment costs in the future, but 
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increase overall availability and reliability of the system. Production line gap was a main 
focus of both program managers. FMS has kept the production line open twice over the 
life cycle of the Apache saving on average $35 million. Shadow is looking to FMS in the 
future to fill a production gap between the end of production of the Shadow and the new 
replacement UAV. Sustainment provides multiple sources of cost avoidances, but the 
values are difficult to calculate since they may occur in the future. 
(iii) International Cooperative Programs 
The analysis showed that creating international partners at the beginning of the 
acquisition process leads to cost savings. Apache experienced over $101.5 million in 
savings through both the ICRDA program and capability enhancement partnerships. 
Apache has one ICRDA partner that co-developed approximately ten product 
improvements and has plans for more. They also have approximately five partners that 
developed unfunded requirements resulting in product improvement at a reduced cost to 
the government. 
b. FMS Public Value Conceptual Framework 
Figure 12 represents a conceptual framework developed by this project through 
the observation and comparison of both a high and low FMS case study. In both cases, 
cost avoidance was a topic that both industry and government personnel were 
comfortable openly describing but were generally only able to provide rough estimates. 
Conversely, cost savings proved more difficult to gain access to raw data. Through 
interviews and open source documents we were able to identify actual sources of cost 
savings but were limited in gaining raw data. We found the resistance to sharing actual 
cost savings data in itself a finding.  
The actual cost savings achieved by an FMS case must be shared by some ratio 
between government and industry. The share ratio is determined by the timing of the 
FMS case and the current state of the government contract. The type of contract the 
government already has with the industry partner sets the parameters for who receives 
more value from the case. If the contract is a Firm Fixed Price contract and categorized as 
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a commercial item, industry legally does not have to reveal rate and pricing data. When 
many of the actual cost saving sources are considered industry proprietary information, 
the government is much less likely to gain cost savings value. However, regardless of 
whether industry captures more profit or government captures more savings the net 
outcome is an increase or benefit to public value. Based on these observations predicting 
potential government cost savings in an FMS case is most dependent on the case timing, 
the contractual relationship between government and industry, and based on these 
observations each program has a potentially unique outcome. 
Figure 12.  Public Value Conceptual Framework: Relating FMS Case Net 
Effects to Public Value 
 
 
The framework shows the relationship FMS has with public value by modeling 
the process through which public value increases or decreases. The process begins with 
the initiation of an FMS case and the determination of cost avoidance and negotiated 
terms. The negotiated terms represent the outcome or attribution of the cost savings value 
to either industry profit, government cost savings, or some combination of both. This 
framework depicts the opposing, interdependent nature of industry profit and government 
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cost savings. The framework suggests that the outcome of the negotiated terms should be 
measured as an absolute value. The combination of cost avoidance and negotiated cost 
savings provides a net effect that serves to either increase or decrease public value. 
c. Findings Resulting from Enfolding Analysis 
(i) Army Procurement Spending Nearly Matched by Army FMS 
In an effort to understand if more emphasis should be placed on a FMS business 
strategy, we conducted further research in the form of interviews with senior acquisition 
professionals and data mining for FMS sales and Army procurement figures. We found a 
significant upward trend in the growth of FMS sales volume. Starting in the 2007 time 
frame we found a significant growth in FMS sales volume that continued to grow nearly 
exponentially through 2009. This growth trend is most likely associated with shifting 
United States National Security Strategy and focus on security cooperation initiatives. As 
depicted in Figure 13, the growth trend appeared to decline and stabilize post 2009; 
however, when Army FMS sales are compared to Army procurements from 2008 to 2015 
another trend emerged. In every year Army FMS sales matched at least 50% of Army 
procurements. This growth represents a significant volume of sales that does not have a 
synchronized business strategy. 
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Figure 13.  Army Procurement Spending Compared to FMS  
 
 
(ii) Root Causes Contributing to Lack of Business Strategy 
FMS is driven by the United States National Security Strategy and allied nation’s 
need for capability. Between the National Security Strategy and the U.S. allies’ capability 
gaps the demand for U.S. capabilities is generated. Therefore, the security strategy drives 
the demand for FMS. However, in interviews with senior acquisition professionals we 
discovered that at no point has there been a complementary business strategy to anticipate 
and take advantage of FMS through a coordinated effort. Specifically, we were not able 
to find instances in which all key U.S. stakeholders in the FMS process met for 
collaborative long range planning to synchronize both a security and business strategy. 
In both cases no internally or externally developed deliberate business strategy 
emerged to synchronize FMS business with the overarching security strategy in order to 
maximize or anticipate value gaining opportunities for the government. Instead we found 
a more reactive or opportunity-based approach in both cases. Common to both cases was 
a considerable amount of uncertainty in timing and quantity associated with FMS cases. 
These uncertainties generally create a win-lose result in the industry and government 
negotiated terms for cost savings value sharing. The uncertainty in timing stems from a 
lengthy FMS process that is difficult to both track and anticipate at the program level. 
Similarly, quantities associated with a FMS cases can fluctuate depending on economic 
circumstances abroad in the recipient nations. Figure 14 represents a depiction of the 
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current root causes preventing the government from gaining more value from FMS cases. 
In order to address these root causes and achieve more win-win negotiations with 
industry, flexibility and predictability should be considered across the FMS enterprise.  
Figure 14.  FMS Value Sharing Challenges and Root Causes 
 
 
(iii) Policy Limitations and Regulatory Tools 
a. Acquisition Policy, DOD 5000.02 
As depicted in Figure 15, we found limited policy with respect to Acquisition 
Strategy and FMS. The DOD 5000.02 makes several short references to international 
sales in Enclosure 2, Program Management. In paragraph seven, it states a program 
manager’s strategy must have understanding of the opportunities in the international 
markets. In paragraph 10, it indicates that program management is responsible to 
integrate international acquisition. Outside of these two paragraphs we found no policy 
indicating how DOD would synchronize a security strategy with a business strategy. 
Seemingly, the lack of linkage between the security strategy and limited acquisition 
policies maybe contributing significantly to the root causes preventing the government 
from gaining a larger share of the cost savings value.  
 52 
Figure 15.  DOD Acquisition Policy and Relationship to FMS 
 
Adapted from: Grafton, J. S. (Ed.). (2015, June 1). The management of security 
cooperation (34th ed.). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute for Security 
Assistance Management p. 13-3. 
b. Potential FMS Tools in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Findings from the comparative case study analysis indicate that one likely root 
cause preventing the government from gaining larger shares of the cost savings was 
timing. A program’s ability to negotiate benefit from an FMS case depends on where the 
program is in the contracting process. If the program is not already committed to a 
contract they may be able to more effectively negotiate win-win terms in the value 
sharing. This drives a need to create flexibility in program production contracts that 
allows for price negotiation or breaks when new FMS volume is introduced. 
Through interviews and researching the FAR we found two particular components 
of the FAR that could provide flexibility to incorporate FMS cases more effectively in 
government contracts. The first comes from FAR Part 15, the part regulating federal 
negotiated contracts. FAR subpart 15.407 covers special cost or pricing agreements and 
in 15.407-3 government contracting officers are given the authority to negotiate forward 
pricing rate agreements. With this provision and some basis of a demand forecast 
contracting officer and programs could potentially build step-pricing agreements based 
on FMS volume increases into contracts.  
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The second useful provision in the FAR come from FAR Part 17, which regulates 
special contracting methods. FAR subpart 17.1 covers multi-year contracting. Multi-year 
contracting exists to allow contracting officers the ability to lower costs by avoiding start 
up and shut down fees. When these two provisions are combined early in the contracting 
process they may provide means for program offices and contracting officers to build 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We developed recommendations and implications as a result of our case analysis 
and findings. These recommendations focus on developing a conceptual framework that 
proposes an integrated FMS strategy. In our recommendation we describe some of the 
necessary relationships between the security and business strategies and propose 
predictability and flexibility as essential components of a targeted FMS business strategy. 
The lack of predictability associated with FMS and government cost savings implies a 
need for the government to more effectively describe the value of the FMS program. Our 
study highlights the need to address the FMS Narrative, consider updating or enforcing 
policy, determine which government organizations should directly benefit from re-
investible cost savings, and assess how organizations can better fit to achieve a 
synchronized approach. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our analysis and findings led us to develop recommendations to address potential 
methods to increase retained value for both the government and industry through the 
FMS process. Our recommendations focus on developing a conceptual framework that 
proposes an integrated FMS strategy. An integrated FMS strategy consists of both a 
targeted business strategy and a security strategy synchronized to develop a more 
predictable and efficient supply and demand relationship. An overarching targeted FMS 
business strategy should exist to complement the existing FMS security strategy. In our 
recommendation, we describe some of the necessary relationships between the security 
and business strategies and propose predictability and flexibility as essential components 
of a targeted FMS business strategy. 
1. Integrated Foreign Military Sales Strategy 
Figure 16 attempts to show at the macro level what elements might be required to 
develop an Integrated Foreign Military Sales Strategy. An Integrated Foreign Military 
Sales Strategy has three core elements: 1. Security Strategy, 2. Targeted FMS Business 
Strategy, and 3. Synchronization. From the findings we understand that the security 
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strategy seems to behave as the demand element of the FMS process. The security 
strategy behaves as the demand element because it regulates what can be sold to whom 
and orchestrates the majority of the FMS case process. Based on the growing and 
substantial volume of FMS sales, a targeted FMS business strategy should be developed 
to organize the supply element. The targeted FMS business strategy may provide a 
complementary balancing effort to the security strategy. The gain from the balancing 
effort could allow the government to capture more value in the FMS process and 
potentially increase opportunity and value for industry as well. The targeted business 
strategy should focus on isolating the most productive weapon categories and then work 
to bring predictability and flexibility to the process. The synchronization of these two 
strategies could be achieved through a variety of organizational and policy driven 
initiatives. This demand and supply relationship necessitates more of a symbiotic 
relationship to fully realize an integrated strategy. 
Figure 16.  Macro View of a Conceptual Integrated Foreign 
Military Sales Strategy 
 
 
a. Predictability as Part of the Targeted FMS Business Strategy 
In order to address the root causes of timing and quantity uncertainty in the FMS 
process, increasing predictability should be considered as a core component to a targeted 
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FMS business strategy. Developing predictive forecasts of the entire FMS portfolio 
would likely prove to be a costly effort. Narrowing the forecasting effort to the weapon 
categories with the highest volume of sales may save considerable resources and become 
a more manageable effort. Narrowing the forecasting effort may result in greater degree 
of accuracy and likely will foster a greater degree of coordination and collaboration 
between stakeholders. Figure 17 shows a potential process to synchronize stakeholders to 
achieve actionable predictability. The process starts with capturing historical demand for 
weapon categories and refining the demand profile periodically based on security strategy 
and demand forecasting to yield high volume FMS areas to focus on. Stakeholders in 
these targeted weapon categories should synchronize deliberately using key timing and 
quantity indicators or metrics in the FMS process such as: 1. Letter of Request, 2. Letter 
of Acceptance and 3. Agreed upon Delivery Schedule. 
 
Figure 17.  Creating Predictability in a Targeted FMS Business Strategy 
 
 
b. Flexibility as Part of the Targeted FMS Business Strategy 
In order to address the root causes of timing and quantity uncertainty in the FMS 
process, increasing flexibility should be considered as a core component to a targeted 
FMS business strategy. In order to increase flexibility in a targeted FMS business 
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strategy, program acquisition strategies should place more emphasis on production 
contract structures. Figure 18, graphically depicts a concept to implement step-pricing 
early in production contracts. Incentivizing contractors with multi-year production 
contracts, authorized by FAR Part 17.1, may produce more favorable conditions to 
negotiate forward pricing rate agreements. Forward pricing rate agreements, authorized 
by FAR 15.407-3, when combined with a predictive or FMS forecast allow the 
contracting officer and contractor to negotiate potential price points based on anticipated 
economic order quantities. In Figure 18, X1 represents the step price reduction when 
FMS quantities are included, and X2 represents a further price reduction if total volume 
of sales is included in the step-pricing model. Ultimately, a multi-year contract with 
forward pricing rate agreements anticipates FMS volume & establishes pre-negotiated 
win-win value sharing terms with industry partners without fully committing the 
government. 
Figure 18.  Contracting to Create Flexibility in the Integrated 




In our study we have identified that the FMS process, strictly in an economic 
sense, generally increases public value. We also believe that a FMS case’s ability to 
provide value to the government in the form of cost savings and cost avoidance is unique 
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to the current contractual relationship between government and industry. Each FMS case 
uniquely contributes to government cost savings and cost avoidance based on the weapon 
category, the state of production, and the existing contract. This uniqueness inherently 
makes estimating government cost savings and cost avoidance difficult to consistently 
predict. The lack of predictability associated with FMS and government cost savings 
implies a need for the government to more effectively describe the value of the FMS 
program. Our study highlights the need to address the FMS narrative, to consider 
updating or enforcing policy, to determine which government organizations should 
directly benefit from re-investible cost savings, and to assess how organizations can 
better fit to achieve a synchronized approach. 
a. FMS Value Narrative 
Using cost savings and cost avoidance as metrics to demonstrate the value of 
FMS is difficult and not likely to be consistent. In most cases this is caused by the natural 
tension between industry profit and government cost savings and by a negotiated 
outcome. Public value appears to be a more reliable metric to describe the full value 
creation of the FMS enterprise. 
b. Policy to Implement a Synchronized Approach 
The significant rise in FMS sales over the last six years is an important trend to 
monitor. The national security strategy continues to focus on security cooperation 
ensuring the increasing trend in FMS. Senior DOD policymakers should consider if 
language found in DOD 5000.02, Enclosure 2 is specific enough to favorably integrate 
FMS into government acquisition strategy? The policy already requires programs to 
update acquisition strategy and foreign sales potential at each milestone. However, the 
policy does not direct any coordinating requirements to drive organizational 
synchronization. This synchronization is essential to collectively arrive at a targeted FMS 
business strategy. 
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c. Cost Savings Implications to Budgeting and Programming  
In order to gain more broad organizational awareness and commitment in creating 
government value from FMS cases, budgeting and programming issues need exploration. 
What happens when more government cost savings are realized through FMS? Is it a 
penalty or a benefit for the associated program? If program managers are able to 
effectively build in FMS and create savings in the production and contract efforts do they 
get to keep the savings? If savings are realized are program budgets necessarily reduce in 
future years? 
d. Negotiating WIN-WIN FMS Solutions with Industry 
Shaping potential future negotiations with industry partners to collaboratively 
structuring contracts in anticipation of FMS sales is a necessary step. The government 
needs to determine what incentives need to come with FMS negotiations in order to 
facilitate more value sharing. The incentives could include measures such as reducing 
case processing time. 
e. Organizing to Support an Integrated FMS Strategy 
The government needs to determine which DOD organizations are value added 
for synchronizing a Security and Business Strategy. They should specify how the liaison 
and leadership roles are defined across the duration of the FMS Case. The government 
needs to address whether these roles should change as the case matures and when the 




In 1976, the Congressional Budget Office conducted an analysis to determine cost 
savings resulting from foreign military sales (FMS) at the request of the House Armed 
Services Committee. This study analyzed 35 weapon systems across the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and noted that only 50% of FMS sales resulted in a cost savings to the 
United States. The FMS sales that generated savings did so at a rate of 14 cents of 
savings for every dollar of sales (Capra, Schafer, & Renehan, 1976, p. 17). The United 
States military industrial base and military programs have seen significant changes since 
1976 warranting a current investigation of the FMS program’s ability to generate 
economic value for U.S. taxpayers. The objective of this study is to address this need. 
This study develops a framework from which to analyze cost avoidance, cost savings, 
and public value and applies this framework to estimate the net benefit to the U.S. 
taxpayers.  
Extant studies of the value of FMS make economic assumptions in regard to 
economies of scale. These reports do not go beyond the notion that increased production 
results in lower costs. However, research and practice suggest many alternative sources 
of value (e.g., learning curve, labor pools, common block upgrades). A deeper 
understanding of the broad spectrum of potential sources of value will allow the USG to 
better leverage increased global demand and capture added value for the taxpayer. A 
current and more complete understanding of actual cost savings and cost avoidances of 
FMS will benefits USG’s entities—from the program office to the taxpayer—by allowing 
decision-makers to make more informed decisions and more fully capture value from the 
FMS program. This study identifies DOD and Army Foreign Military Sales demand 
trends, defines cost savings and cost avoidance, creates a framework from which to 
analyze the economic impacts of FMS and analyzes the barriers to leveraging FMS to 
generate cost savings and cost avoidances. 
We conducted a comparative case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) using 
two organizations representing the upper and the lower limits of Army FMS volume. The 
comparative case study method is a well-suited research approach for this FMS project. 
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This study describes the value to the government generated by FMS and also explores 
why and how this value is created (Yin, 2009, p. 3). The cases for this study were 
selected purposefully to yield information rich instances of the focal phenomena (Patton, 
2002). This selection limits the influence of organization structure and practices, allowing 
influences associated with sales volume to be more observable. DSCA’s online archived 
news releases were used to identify cases. DSCA’s news releases represent the required 
notification of Congress of a likely FMS. These news releases include an estimated dollar 
figure, a weapon description, and known or anticipated prime vendors (by location). The 
news releases do not represent actual sales from foreign nations; however, they do 
represent a demand signal. Based on an analysis of DSCA’s archival information, we 
selected the Army’s AH-64 Apache Helicopter to represent the high case and the Army’s 
RQ-7B TUAS Shadow to represent the low case for this comparative case study. 
We focused initially on each individual case to determine the program’s strategy 
related to FMS, determining the sources of cost savings and cost avoidance, and then 
analyzing the strategy’s effect on those sources. After analyzing within each case, we 
then compared between the cases. The comparison focused on the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the two strategy’s sources. We identified trends, opportunities, 
and implications that may exist when future FMS cases are considered and developed an 
initial framework. We then iterated between our initial model, the data and literature to 
further refine the model and identify recommendations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
The initial framework suggested the importance of the role played by program strategy in 
trends and opportunities. We focused our subsequent investigation on identifying sources 
of cost savings and cost avoidance and analyzing the effect of the program’s FMS 
strategy on the sources.  
The Apache and Shadow programs illustrate the depth of opportunity created by 
FMS. Though the total value created through FMS may not be entirely clear, the analysis 
shows increased cost savings and cost avoidances are captured by the USG. We identified 
key findings that included sources of cost savings and cost avoidance, a public value 
framework, Army procurement spending is nearly matched by Army FMS, and 
 63 
determined uncertainty in order quantities and contractual limitations as root causes 
contributing to lack of FMS business strategy. 
Three categories of cost savings and cost avoidance are evident from our analysis: 
economies of scale, sustainment and international cooperative programs. The actual cost 
savings achieved by an FMS case must be shared by some ratio between government and 
industry. The share ratio is determined by the timing of the FMS case and the current 
state of the government contract. The type of contract the government already has with 
the industry partner sets the parameters for who receives more value from the case. We 
found a significant upward trend in the growth of FMS sales volume. Starting in the 2007 
time frame we found a significant growth in FMS sales volume that continued to grow 
nearly exponentially through 2009. This growth represents a significant volume of sales 
that does not have a synchronized business strategy. 
We developed recommendations and implications as a result of our case analysis 
and findings. These recommendations focus on developing a conceptual framework that 
proposes an integrated FMS strategy. In our recommendation we describe some of the 
necessary relationships between the security and business strategies and propose 
predictability and flexibility as essential components of a targeted FMS business strategy. 
The lack of predictability associated with FMS and government cost savings implies a 
need for the government to more effectively describe the value of the FMS program. Our 
study highlights the need to address the FMS Narrative, consider updating or enforcing 
policy, determine which government organizations should directly benefit from re-
investible cost savings, and assess how organizations can better fit to achieve a 
synchronized approach. 
Our analysis and findings are limited based on variety of factors. We purposefully 
selected cases to be illustrative of the FMS process and environment. However, these two 
cases represent only a small sample size and should not lead to concrete conclusions. 
Rather the findings from these cases allow for some generalization and for a more 
rigorous debate. Future research and study should focus on larger samples to confirm 
similar findings. 
 64 
The topic of FMS and government cost savings and avoidance has further 
research potential. Further research opportunities revolve around organizational structure, 
policy, programming and budgeting. Is DOD 5000.02, Enclosure 2 specific enough to 
favorably integrate FMS into government acquisition strategy? The policy already 
requires programs to update acquisition strategy and foreign sales potential at each 
milestone. However, the policy does not direct any coordinating requirements to drive 
organizational synchronization. If program managers are able to effectively build in FMS 
and create savings in the production and contract efforts do they get to keep the savings? 
If savings are realized are program budgets necessarily reduce in future years? The 
government needs to determine which DOD organizations are value added for 
synchronizing a security and business strategy. They should specify how the liaison and 
leadership roles are defined across the duration of the FMS case. The government needs 
to address questions such as, should these roles change as the case matures or when does 
the security strategy or business strategy have priority?  
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